Charles Robert Bates v. Geneva Carol Bates : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1976
Charles Robert Bates v. Geneva Carol Bates : Brief
of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
George H. Searle; Attorney for Appellant.
Jed W. Shields; Attorney for Respondent.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Bates v. Bates, No. 197614556.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1976).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/391
UTAH UTAH SUPRtME COURT 
DOCUMENT 
ooeaifm 
BlHEf 
j£?*fl-
COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES ROBERT BATES 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
GENEVA CAROL BATES 
Defendant and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 14556 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT A>ID FROM ORDER OF 1HE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT ?OR SALT LAIS COUNTY 
*:onorabl<?. BRJXANT H. CROFT, Judge 
JED W. SHIELDS 
Attorney for Respondevit 
4 23 East. 4 00 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 3411.1 
! L E D 
SEP 3 0 1975 
'% €!er!:s Suprcra Ccarf, U*J* 
IN Till' SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES RORFRT RATES 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
GENEVA CAROL BATES 
Defendant and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT AND FROM ORDER OF THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Honorable BRYANT II. CROFT, Judge 
JED W. SHIELDS 
Attorney for Respondent 
243 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, UTah 84111 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Statement of Kind of Case 1 
Disposition by the Lower Court 1 
Relief Sought by Respondent 3 
Argument 3 
POINT 1 3 
THE ORDERS. GRANTING ONLY A PORTION OF THE UNPAID ALIMONY 
SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 
52 U.R.C.P. AND ARE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LOWER COURTS 
DISCRETION BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS 
OF FACT. 
POINT II 5 
THE LOWER COURT BY RESERVING JURISDICTION OVER THE 
QUESTION OF VISITATION RIGHTS ACTED WITHIN ITS 
STATUTORY MANDATE AND IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CHILDREN. 
POINT III 7 
THE CASES LISTED BY THE APPELLANT AS BEING SUPPORTIVE 
OF HER POSITION DO NOT PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT 
Conclusion 15 
CASES CITED 
Flannery v. Flannery 536 P. 2dl36 (Utah 1975) 4 
Hansen v. Hansen 537 P. 2d 491 (Utah 1975) 4 
McBroom v. McBroom, 14 Utah 2d 393 6 
Ring v. Ring 29 Utah 2d 436 4 
Wilson v. Wilson 5 Ut. 2d 279. . . . i. 4 
APPELLANT'S CASES SUBJECTED TO ANALYSIS 
Anderson v. Anderson 104 Ut 104 ..
 k . . . . . . . . . ^ . 7 
Foreman v. Foreman H I Ut 72 -,-.-.- . - . . . - . . . - « 8 
McDonald v. McDonald 120 Ut 573 8 
Pinion v. Pinion 92 Ut 255 9 
Wilson v. Wilson 5 Ut 2d 79 9 
Meyers v. Meyers 62 Ut 90 
Marks v. Marks 98 Ut 400 11 
Openshaw v. Openshaw 102 Ut 22 11 
Larson v. Larson 9 Ut 2d 160 12 
Wallis v. Wallis 9 Ut 2d 237 12 
McKay v. McKay 13 Ut 2d 187 13 
Scott v. Scott 19 Ut 2d 267 13 
Aldrich v. Aldrich 119 Ut 504 13 
Cecil v. Cecil 11 Ut 2d 155 13 
Kent v. Kent 28 Ut 2d 34 13 
Ring v. Ring 29 Ut 2d 436 14 
Smith v. Smith 9 Ut 2d 157 14 
Stuber v. Stuber 121 Ut 632 14 
Dearden v. Dearden 15 Ut 2d 105 14 
Peters v. Peters 15 Ut 2d 413 14 
Sorensen v. Sorensen 20 Ut 2d 360 15 
Allen v. Allen 25 Ut 2d 87 15 
King v. King 25 Ut 2d 163 15 
Felt v. Felt 27 Ut 2d 103 15 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES ROBERT BATES, 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
vs. 
GENEVA CAROL BATES, 
Defendant and 
Appellant, 
Case No. 14556 
RESPONDENT'S BRI^F 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The Parties obtained a Divorce in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County on April 8th, 1974, custody of their four (4) 
children being awarded to the Respondent. On January 23rd, 1976 
the Appellant brought an Order to Show Cause against the Respon-
dent seeking a judgment for unpaid alimony and modification 
of the Decree as it related to her visiting privileges. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
The Order to Show Cause initiated by the Appellant was 
thereafter heard on January 20th, 1976, before the Honorable 
Bryant H. Croft. At the conclusion of the hearing it was deter-
mined that under the circumstances the Appellant was not entitle 
to the accrued but unpaid alimony and that the Respondent need 
not pay any additional alimony until the Appellant's living cir-
cumstances changed. The lower court further reserved jurisdic-
tion over the question of visitation rights and ordered that 
the children of the parties would not be required to visit 
their mother until such time as the Appellant could show that 
there had been a change in her living circumstances. This or-
der was entered March 12th, 1976. 
The Appellant, pursuant to Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, on March 19th, 1976, moved that the lower 
court grant a new hearing on her Order to Show Cause, and/or 
for an amendment of the Judgement claiming that an error 
of law had been committed in failing to grant accrued but un-
paid alimony. On March 31st, 1976, this matter came before 
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft who granted Appellant's motion 
for Amendment of the Judgement as to alimony'payments accrued 
and unpaid as follows; $75 in November of 1974, and $150 per 
month for December 1974 through February 1975, for a total 
Judgement against the Respondent in the sum of $520; however, 
Appellant's notion to amend the balance of accrued but unpaid 
alimony was denied. 
Appellant brought this appeal now before the Court peti-
tioning that the lower court's Order, entered March 12th, 1976, 
be set aside and the relief prayed for in the Appellant's Or-
der, dated January 23rd, 1976, be granted. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT BY RESPONDENT 
The Respondent respectfully petitions that the Court deny 
the Appeal and affirm the Order and Amended Judgement entered by 
the lower court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE ORDERS GRANTING ONLY A PORTION OF THE UNPAID ALIMONY 
SOUGHT BY THE APPELLANT SATISFY THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 52 U.R. 
C.P. AND ARE WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LOWER COURTS DISCRETION 
BEING CONSISTENT WITH THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The Courts of the State of Utah h^ .ve continuing jurisdic-
tion as it relates to divorce cases pursuant to the powers 
granted by Section 30-3-5 (1975 as amended) of the Utah Code 
Annotated which provides as follows: 
When a Decree of Divorce is made, the Court 
may make such orders in relation to the children, 
property and parties, and the maintenance of the parties 
and children, as may be equitable. The Court shall 
have continuing jurisdiction to make such subsequent 
changes or new orders with respect to the support 
and maintenance of the parties . . . (Id., at 319) 
Clearly, the lower court was exercising this power and 
discretion when, on March 31st, 1976, it granted Appellant's 
Motion for Amendment of the Judgement as to Alimony payments 
accrued and unpaid from November 1974 through February 1975 
(in the amount of $525) at which time the Appellant was making 
her own way. The lower court was exercising that same power 
and discretion when it denied Appellant's motion to amend the 
balance of accrued but unpaid support for the period of ap-
proximately one year (March 1975 through March 1976) when she 
was residing with a man in the State of Idaho. The lower 
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court in its rulings has in no way demonstrated the flclear 
abuse of discretion" (Wilson v. Wilson 5ut2d79 at 84)that 
must be manifest under Utah case law nor departed from the 
"reasonable and prudent1' standard (Flannery v. Flannery 536 
p.2d 136 Utah 1975) for such matters in any way that justi-
fies an Appeal. Further, the questionable living arrangements 
of the Appellant are surely a "substantial change in the 
material circumstances" (Ring v. Ring 29 Utah 2d 436 at 441) 
sufficient to justify the lower court's action which must 
fall within the "considerable latitude permitted the lower 
court and indeed the burden is upon the Appellant to show 
otherwise (Hansen v. Hansen 537P. 2d491 (Utah 1975)). 
The lower court under Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure did make Findings of Fact in its Order of Judge-
ment dated March 12th, 1976, Appellant's contentions to the 
contrary, wherein 
...the Court did find that the defendant (the Appellant) 
has been residing with a man in the State of Idaho 
for a period of approximately one (1) year, and said 
defendant advised the court that she was not ready 
to get married at this time; and based upon the de-
fendant's testimony, and the Court being fully ad-
vised, . . (I_d. P.l.) 
The Respondent strenuously contends that the lower court 
fully satisfied the substance of Rule 52 U.R.C.P. in regard 
to both fact and law by reference to the evidence heard 
by the Court, and preserved in the transcript, in its Order 
of March 12th, 1976, and by reference to the legal brief 
filed by Appellant's own counsel in its amended order granted 
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March 31st, 1976. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further 
states that "... findings of fact shall not be set aside unless 
clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the oppor-
tunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses.11 The lower court had, and exercised, the opportunity 
to examine the facts and to cross-examine the Appellant and 
to reach the conclusion found in Pages 122 through 125 of the 
Transcript. Such conclusions should not be set lightly aside 
as the Appellant would have this court do. 
The Respondent strenuously contends that the lower court in 
no way abused its discretion but merely exercised the power 
granted under 30-3-5 U.C.A. and at the same time satisfied in 
substance, the requirements of Rule 52 Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT BY RESERVING JURISDICTION OVER THE QUES-
TION OF VISITATION RIGHTS ACTED WITHIN ITS STATUTORY MANDATE 
AND IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILDREN. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 30-3-5 (1975, as 
amended) the lower court: 
...shall have continuing jurisdiction to make such subse-
quent changes or new orders with respect to the support 
and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the child-
ren and their support and maintenance, or the distribu-
tion of the property as shall be reasonable and necessary. 
visitation rights of parents and grandparents and other 
relatives ahaLl take into consideration tha welfare of 
ths_chlld. (Id. at 319-320) Emphasis added. 
By reserving jurisdiction over the question of the visi-
tation rights of the Appellant, in its Order of March 12, 1976, 
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the lower court acted within the parameter of its statutory 
mandate in the best interests of the children. In addition 
the lower court provided the Appellant with the opportunity 
to regain her privileges at such time as she could demonstrate 
a change in her living circumstances (Transcript at 122). 
The children themselves, it appears, do not wish to 
visit the Appellant (see Transcript p. 110, and Affidavit 
of Respondent Charles R. Bates dated February 10, 1976, 
paragraph #8), and by refusing to force them to do so the 
lower court took "into consideration the welfare of the 
child(ren)TI as 30-5-5 U.C.A. demands it should. 
Indeed, not only the present questionable living con-
ditions of the Appellant, as set forth in the lower court's 
Order of Judgement dated March 12, 1976, but also her ap-
parently unstable and itinerent life since leaving the Salt 
Lake City area in November of 1974, militate against com-
pelling the children to unwillingly undertake extended vi-
sits with the Appellant. 
Whether or not the Appellant has been, or is, leading 
an immoral life is not at issue here, erratic behavior, as 
case law indicates (see McBroom v. McBroom 14 Utah 2d 399), 
in and of itself is sufficient for the lower court, in its 
discretion, to make change in visitation privileges. 
The lower court has clearly acted within its discretion 
and statutor2/ mandate in this matter and has not only care-
fully considered the well being of the children but has left 
the door open for the Appellant to stablize her life and 
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regain the privileges she desires. 
POINT III 
THE CASES LISTED BY THE APPELLANT AS BEING SUPPORTIVE 
OF HER POSITION DO NOT PROVIDE SUCH SUPPORT. 
It should be emphasized that the Appellant not only fails 
to specifically apply the battery of Utah cases listed on 
pages eight through ten of her brief, but also that the major-
ity of said cases are: 
(a) not on point with the instant case and, 
(b) deal largely with issues at best-only 
tangential to the case at bar, and 
(c) are in fact, supportive of tfye respondents 
position as regards the disctetionary powers 
of the lower court. 
Even so, because said cases are listed by the Appellant 
as overwhelming authority for her position it is the Respondentr: 
duty to undertake a tedious demonstration, on a case by case 
basis, in order to show the validity of contentions (a) through 
(c) supra. The cases are dealt with in the order listed by 
Appellant. 
1. Anderson v. Anderson: 104 Ut 104 deals with the 
Divorce of a "Mail order Bride" after a five day marriage, 
the Court affirming the lower court's decision for the husband 
and denying alimony and a property settlement to the wife. 
The Court held that the granting of alimony "rests within the 
sound discretion of the trial court" (at P.108) and will be 
modified Monly when there is a clear abuse of discretion" 
(Ibid) This case deals with the granting of alimony, not its 
modification which is the relevant issue in the case at bar. 
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Indeed, if this case has pertinence it is in that it is sup-
portive of the Respondent's position as regards the in-
tegrity of the trial court's discretion rather than any 
contention of the Appellant. 
The Appellant on page twelve of her brief also quotes 
dictum from Anderson as if it were a holding which it was 
not, as the Court, in an aside, was speaking generally about 
some of the reasons for granting alimony which did not ap-
ply in Anderson, and do not apply in the instant case either. 
2. Foreman v. Foreman: III Ut 72 concerns a wife's 
appeal against a contempt judgement below for failing to 
return certain bonds to her husband, and the husband's 
contention that the wife should return not only the bonds but 
also cash which she had taken from a safety deposit box the 
day the day the divorce action was initiated, and which had 
later been allowed her by the court below. As the Court was 
unclear as to how the rights of the respective parties to 
cash the bonds had been arrived at and computed, the matter 
was returned to the lower court for a reassessment. A case 
which it is submitted has little relevance to the matter at 
hand. 
3. McDonald v. McDonald: 120 Ut 573 is a case concerning 
the alimony that was to be paid to an alcoholic wife, and 
again the Court reaffirmed the position that "the (lower) court 
having continuing jurisdiction to do so" may adjust the alimony 
when appropriate, and that "if there is a substantial change 
in circumstances a review and revision of the Decree to meet 
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them may be had/1 (at p. 583). Again, a case surely supportive 
of the Respondent's position, not that of the Appellant, al-
though the issue of granting the alimony initially is not itself 
an issue in the case at bar. 
4. Pinion v. Pinion: 92 Ut. 255. is the famous "mis-
adventure in matrimony" (at p. 260) case concerning the division 
of property between a railroad worker and his wife. The Court 
held that "every intendment should be in favor of the trial 
court, for not only does he in a divorce case have the parties 
before him, enabling him to test credibility by demeanor, but 
the conduct and manner of the parties in the Court room some-
times gives much aid in solving who really is at fault, "(at 
p. 262). Again while not strictly relevant in that it deals 
with the actual award not its modification below, the language 
of the Court seems supportive of the Respondent's contentions, 
not those of the Appellant. 
5. Wilson v. Wilson: 5 Ut 2d.79. In this case the hus-
band obtained a divorce in order to marry another woman and on 
appeal claimed the award to his former wife was vindictive. The 
Court in upholding the decision below stated that "no firm 
rule can be uniformly applied to all divorce cases, and each 
must be determined upon the basis of the immediate fact situ-
ation" (at p. 82) and further declared that "The more recent 
pronouncements of this Court, and the policy to which we ad-
here, are to the effect that the trial judge has considerable 
latitude of discretion in such matters and that his judgement 
should not be changed lightly and in fact, not at all, unless 
it works such a manifest unjustice or inequity as to indicate a 
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clear abuse of discretion." (at p. 86, emphasis added). 
Such a holding and policy statement could not be more in 
accord with the Respondent's views and more inamicable to 
the Appellant's position even though she cites it. While 
modification, not the initial Decree, is the issue in the 
present case the policy annuciated by the Court would seem 
to be applicable and most damaging to the Appellant. 
6. Myers v. Myers: Actually Meyers v. Meyers 62 Ut 90 
is a 1923 case which revolved around four central issues: 
The first issue concerned whether acceptance of service in 
another state and taking of time to plead constituted an 
appearance and whether the Court had jurisdiction to render 
an alimony Jddgement,issues not relevant here; the second 
issue was whether remarriage automatically terminated judge-
ment for alimony. The Court was of the opinion it did not 
automatically do so, authorities at the time being" not in 
harmony" (at p. 93), but that it would be " a ground of 
application for discharging the defendant from further pay-
ment." (at p. 94. citing Kansas Supreme Court) - again not 
a viable issue here. 
The third issue concerns whether alimony may be modified 
or adjusted in the discretion of the trial court and the Court 
held it could be modified quoting §3000, Comp. Laws Utah 1917 
(at p. 96). 
The final issue concerned a discussion of a New York 
Statute (Code Civ. Proc § 1771) which permitted not only modi-
fication but annulment of past due alimony and the Court felt 
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this conflicted with Sistare v. Sistare, 218 US 16 (1910) , and 
felt that past due alimony should not be modified for the pe-
riod prior to an application to modify the original decree. 
While it may be that the Appellant can draw some support from 
these 1910 and 1923 cases there is no indication as to which 
language or holding the Appellant is relying upon, and to what 
extent, if any. Further it should be noted that in the in-
stant case the court below granted the Appellant accrued but 
unpaid alimony on March 31st, 1976 when it amended its pre-
vious judgement. 
7. Marks v. Marks: 98 Ut 400. Many of the issues in the 
1940 case are extraneous to the matter at hand (e.g. Did wife 
have right to attorney's fees? Did the husband actually pay the 
support money?etc), but the pertinent holding is that prior to 
modification of alimony and child support payments by the court 
below such accrued but unpaid monies should be recovered by the 
wife. It should be noted that the wife has granted only token 
alimony and that the bulk of the money she sought to recover 
was child support money, and it was this money that concerned 
the Court most. 
Again the Appellant does not indicate how this case is to 
be applied, nor is specific language cited. Further, child 
support is not an issue, as the Respondent entirely supports 
and has custody of his children, not the Appellant. 
8. Openshaw v. Openshaw 102 Ut >22. This case came be-
fore the Court on three ocassions in 1934, 1941 and 1942. On 
-11-
each occasion, modification of alimony and child support was 
the issue - the husband wishing to decrease payments (as the 
child had reached majority) and the wife wishing to increase 
them. Because Mno application had been made to the Court to 
abate, reduce or modify the provisions of the Decree ff(at 
p. 25) and because the Petition had been "dismissed with 
prejudice11 (Ibid) the Court held that it "was powerless 
to revoke or modify the provisions of the Decree "(ibid). 
This case is not applicable to the present case as the lower 
court has already in its discretion, having heard both 
parties, issued an order modifying the alimony. 
9. Larson v. Larson: 9 Ut 2d 160 Is totally irrelevant 
to the present case it deals with interest upon child sup-
port payments and the Respondent, not the Appellant, has 
custody of, and supports, the children. 
10. _Wallis j^JHfallis: 9 Ut 2d 237 concerns a post-
divorce agreement between husband and wife, reducing child 
support and alimony payments which the husband failed to 
pay. The Court found that the husband hadn't willfully breached 
the agreement in his failure to pay (being unemployed) and 
remanded the matter to the trial court for adjustment and 
reassessment of the agreement in its discretion. This case 
reaffirms the Respondent's position, npt the Appellant's, in 
that the lower-cmirt's power to adjust matters "as it deems 
equitable and proper under all circumstances" (at pc 240> 
within the bounds of its discretion is again annunciated. 
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11. Mckay v. Mckay: 13 Ut 2d 189 (actually 187) This case 
involves unpaid "support money awarded for... (a) minor child11 
(at p. 188), a matter not pertinent to the present case, as no 
child support is involved. The other issues raised in this 
case, such as laches and contempt of court are equally irrelevant 
to the matter at bar. 
12. Scott v. Scott: 19 Ut 2d 267 concerns the full faith 
and credit to be given to a Nevada decree, and the issue of 
modification of such a decree by domestic court. An issue 
which again is not relevant here. 
13. Aldrich v. Aldrich: 119 Ut 504 concerns whether alimony 
can be forfieted at the time of Divorce because of wrong doing 
during the marriage, not whether adjustments c#n be made at 
a later time in the discretion of the Court. A matter not 
of immediate concern in this case. 
14- Cecil v. Cecil: 11 Ut 2d 155 deals with the invalid 
remarriage of a mentally incompetent woman, and whether such 
a union terminates alimony. Because of her mental condition 
and the fact that she was not supported during the "marriage", 
the Court held alimony was not termintaed. A £ase of question-
able relevance to the matter at hand. 
15- Kent v. Kent: 28 Ut 2d 34. Here the wife entered, un-
knowingly, into a union with a still-married m#n; as she was 
victum of fraud and annuled the marriage immediately when the 
true came to light, the Court held her right to alimony was 
preserved. Again an issue not on point with tfte case at bar. 
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16. Ring v. Ring: 29 Ut 2d 436, This case affirms' the 
need to show a change in the wife's material circumstances 
before a Decree can be modified. 
The determination has already been made by the court 
below as evidenced by its modification of the Decree, such 
modification being within the bonds of its discretion. 
17. Smith v. Smith: 9 Ut 2d 157 refers to the matters 
of custody of children, not visitation rights, and here the 
Court applied (at p. 158) a !fin the best interest of the 
children11 standard. The Respondent has custody of his 
children and no-where has the Appellant sought for custody, 
hence this case is again extraineous to the case here. 
18. Stuber v. Stuber: 121 Ut 623 is again a custody 
case in which the father, although more morally upright, 
had a less stable environment to offer his children than his 
adulterous wife whose home environment (her mother's home) 
was more established. The Court was unwilling to disturb 
the lower court's ruling that the custody of the children 
go to the mother and its other findings therein (at p.637). 
Again custody is not in issue here and again the 
lower court's discretion is upheld. 
19. Dearden v. Dearden: 15 Ut 2d 105 is another custody 
issue case almost identical to Stuber v. Stuber Supra. 
20. Peters v. Peters: 15 Ut 2d 413 concerns the right 
of the trial Court to order payment of temporary alimony un-
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til the husband paid a lump sum of $2,500 to his ex-wife (he 
having received the home and various securities). The Court 
held the lower court was within its right's to so order. 
Once again the discretionary power of the lower court is affirmed 
although the case has little to do with the matter on appeal. 
21-24. Sorensen v. Sorensen: 20 Ut 2d 360. Allen v. Allen 
25 Ut 2d 163, King v. King 25 Ut 2d 163 and Felt v Felt 27 
Ut 2d 103 are similer cases in that they hold that a sufficient 
and demonstrable change of circumstances must be indicated 
before the trial court can modify the Decree in either parties 
favor. Although it is clear that the Court under Const. Art. 
8§9 may examine both law and fact, as divorce is an equity 
matter (King supra.) and make determinations, in all these 
cases the Court remands the matter to the loxsrer court to 
make such adjustments and determination as may be necessary 
and as it sees fit in its discretion. I 
It is then submitted that an examination of these 24 
cases listed by the Appellant reveals that the position of the 
Respondent, not the Appellant; is most supported by Utah case 
law, to-wit: the trial Court has great latitude of discretion 
in making its determination in regard to modification of alimony 
decrees and such determinations will not be over-turned unless 
a manifest abuse of said discretion has occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Appellant's petition 
-15-
should be denied. From the arguments outlined in this 
brief it is clear that the lower court acted fully within 
the parameters of its statutory mandate and discretion in 
accord with Utah case law, and further acted with the 
best interests of the children of the parties in mind. 
For this reason the Court should affirm the Order issued by 
the lower court on March 12, 1976, and the Amended Judgement 
heard on March 31, 1976. ^ 
Respectfully submitted this day of September, 1976. 
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